Democratic Integration of Former Insurgents:

Evidence from a Civic Inclusion Campaign in Colombia

María Ignacia Curiel, Cyrus Samii, and Mateo Vásquez-Cortés*

---

*Curiel is PhD Candidate in Politics at New York University (mariaignaciacuriel@nyu.edu), Samii is Associate Professor of Politics at New York University (cds2083@nyu.edu), and Vásquez-Cortés is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (mateo.vasquez@itam.mx). This project is supported by a grant from the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and research funds provided by New York University. It is approved under New York University institutional review board protocol IRB-FY2020-3678, and a pre-analysis plan was registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP-20200210AA) prior to analysis of outcome data.

Abstract

We study the effects of a non-governmental civic inclusion campaign on the democratic integration of demobilized insurgents. Democratic participation ideally offers insurgents a peaceful channel for political expression and addressing grievances. However, existing work suggests that former combatant's ideological socialization and experiences of violence fuel hard-line commitments which may be contrary to democratic political engagement, threatening the effectiveness of postwar electoral transitions. We use a field experiment with demobilized FARC combatants in Colombia to study how a civic inclusion campaign affects trust in political institutions, democratic political participation, and preferences for strategic moderation versus ideological rigidity. We find the campaign increased trust in democracy and support for political compromise. Effects are driven by the most educated ex-combatants moving from more hard-line positions to ones that are in line with their peers, and by ex-combatants who had the most violent conflict experience similarly moderating their views.

Keywords: Rebel-to-party transformations, democratic integration, ex-combatant reintegration, civics

We examine the potential for a civic inclusion campaign to promote the democratic integration of former insurgent combatants in Colombia. Such political integration has been central to many post-conflict reconstruction processes; nearly half of all countries emerging from civil conflict since the end of the Cold War (Manning and Smith, 2016). Democratic integration of insurgents ideally decreases the potential for renewed political violence by providing peaceful channels for political expression and addressing grievances. But in about half of all rebel-to-party transitions, ex-combatant factions abandon the democratic path and return to war (Daly 2020). Sometimes this is a result of external threats to insurgent groups, but sometimes it is due to challenges that arise from within the groups themselves (Acosta 2014; Söderberg Kovacs 2008; Zaks 2017). For example, rigid ideological beliefs and mistrust of the democratic system although productive for rebels to maintain ex-combatant purpose and unit cohesion during conflict could generate inefficiencies in the peace bargaining process (Kydd and Walter 2002; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2013; Walter 1997).

Unfortunately, peace-building missions and ex-combatant reintegration programs have taken only limited steps toward actively facilitating political integration (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010; UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament and Reintegration 2019). And unlike strategies to promote economic and social reintegration, strategies to foster political reintegration of ex-combatants remain understudied.

We study a non-governmental civic inclusion campaign that worked with former combatants from the insurgent movement *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) after the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia. Consistent with the peace agreement, the campaign was designed to facilitate democratic engagement by informing ex-combatants about democratic institutions, answering questions about the democratic process and addressing possible misinformation or misunderstanding about how Colombia's institutions work. In addition to providing information on Colombian democratic institutions, the workshops offered a forum for open discussion among ex-combatants. In each of the nine sites where the study was implemented, participants were randomly assigned to be interviewed before or after the campaign workshops. From an ethical perspective, this research design respects the broad desire among ex-combatants to participate in the activities while also allowing us to identify causal effects with reasonable accuracy.

Studies of post-conflict civic programs designed for civilians are optimistic about the potential to encourage democratic participation (e.g., Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Finkel 2014). But are such programs also helpful for former insurgents, who may have deeper antagonism towards the state and commitments to hard-line ideological positions? We address this question by examining whether the campaign affected former insurgents' trust in political institutions, interest in participating in elections, and judgments about the need for political moderation versus ideological rigidity. We also study for whom the campaign appeared to make the biggest difference.

Our findings suggest that civic inclusion campaigns can contribute to ex-combatants' democratic political engagement. The campaign increased ex-combatant trust in Colombian political institutions and democratic processes. Effects on intended political participation were negligible, because baseline rates of intended participation were very high, consistent with evidence on war exposure and political participation (Bauer et al. 2016; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015; Blattman 2009). We also find that ex-combatants expressed more politically moderate views after attending the workshop. Participation in the workshop increased support for their party to join coalitions and alliances with ideologically similar parties, and for their party to moderate its policy platform. We explore potential mechanisms underlying the workshop's moderating effect, including mechanisms proposed by the inclusion-moderation literature (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kalyvas 2003; Brocker and Künkler 2013; Tepe 2019), as well as "posturing" and researcher demand effects. A closer look at heterogeneous treatment effects shows that increased support for moderation is mainly driven by shifts in two ex-combatant subgroups: those with more years of schooling and more violent conflict experiences.

First, our findings show that prior to the workshop, more educated ex-combatants were the least supportive of FARC choosing to moderate its party platform, but after participating in the workshop, they shifted from an especially hard-line position to one that approximates that of their less educated, yet more moderate, peers. That more educated types may have been concerned with supporting positions that were consistent with the group's revolutionary platform, and therefore less willing to support party strategy of platform moderation, would be consistent with existing work showing, counter-intuitively, that reintegration is sometimes more challenging among educated types (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007).

Second, ex-combatants who had more violent experiences of conflict shifted from being unsupportive of a platform of political compromise in the baseline to more enthusiastic support for political compromise after participating in the workshop, in line with their peers whose experience of conflict was less violent. This evidence is consistent with literature that suggests that encounters with violence, both as victims and perpetrators, may cause hard-line attitudes (e.g. Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). But our findings also suggest that such attitudes and beliefs are not set in stone and that civic inclusion campaigns are especially effective among those who would otherwise be the most hard-line.

Finally, evidence suggests that the increased support for moderation is not attributable to a shift in ex-combatants' ideology, nor is it attributable to their increased trust in democracy. Placebo tests help in addressing concerns about demand effects.

Barriers to Insurgents' Democratic Integration

Challenges to insurgent political integration are sometimes external to the former insurgent groups, such as security threats posed by political enemies (Fergusson et al. 2020; Walter 2002). Such challenges depend on macro-level and elite-level dynamics. Yet challenges to integration may also arise from factors that are internal to the group, including factors that contribute to ideological or organizational rigidity as well as possibly limited and antagonistic experience with state institutions (Zaks, 2017; Soderstrom, 2015; Wood, 2000). This paper is focused on strategies to address such internal challenges in the context of a peace agreement that creates a genuine space for former insurgents' democratic engagement.

Firm ideological commitments to the group's revolutionary cause and to fellow comrades are critical for insurgent groups during conflict. In addition to the ideological motivations that often underpin individuals' choices to join insurgencies (Arjona and Kalyvas 2011, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), rebel leaders tend to invest heavily in indoctrination and political education to heighten morale and tighten unit cohesion given the difficulty of providing material selective incentives (Hoover Green 2018). Resulting ideological rigidity can impede post-conflict political integration. Existing work on Colombia indicates FARC leadership mandated for combatants to attend ideological training regularly, sometimes on a daily basis (Arjona 2016). Consistent with this evidence, Oppenheim et al. 2015 shows

FARC ex-combatants are particularly sensitive to group-members' deviations from original ideological principals and more likely to defect as a result.

Existing evidence also suggests that the experience of conflict-related violence tends to cultivate hard-line positions and low levels of trust in democratic institutions (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015; De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Littman 2018; Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2019; Hadzic and Tavits 2019). These effects may even have lasting inter-generational implications (e.g.Wang 2019). Such effects could be due to dissonance for those who have perpetrated violence against the state (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2018), but could also be a reaction to anticipating stigmatization by mainstream society. Evidence suggests that conflict experience diminishes trust in state institutions among former Colombian combatants (Kreutz and Nussio 2019; Nussio and Oppenheim 2014). These challenges are exacerbated by informational barriers, a climate of political stigmatization, lack of resources, and little experience with the democratic political system.

Civic Inclusion for Former Insurgents

Civic inclusion initiatives have been employed as a tool to promote post-conflict *civilian* democratic engagement (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Finkel 2014). Theories that motivate such interventions may be applicable to former insurgents. By explaining details of democratic processes, civic education programs directly compensate for lack of experience, which may be especially acute among former insurgents. Civic inclusion programs can also counter misinformation and misunderstanding, which may remain unchallenged within isolated insurgent networks. The civic inclusion campaign provides former insurgents with information regarding the institutions of government and the means through which voters and parties can influence policy outcomes. They also provide an opportunity for attendees to discuss politics with each other in a neutral space. Such opportunities for discussion are likely novel for ex-combatants and contrast with hierarchical interactions within the former insurgent group. It follows that, in theory, a civic inclusion program may increase trust in political institutions and in democracy and may motivate participation. The civic inclusion campaign may address mistrust in the democratic system by demystifying the process and generating confidence in the outcomes of engaging. Acquiring a better understanding of the political system may dispel existing misconceptions or questions that fuel mistrust. The presence of peers and discussions may serve to minimize coordination costs and encourage participation. Thus, we hypothesize the civic inclusion campaign will increase former combatants' trust in the democratic system and willingness to participate (**H1**).

Civic inclusion campaigns may soften ideological attachments that prevent democratic integration of former insurgents. Scholarship on the intra-party dynamics of "niche parties" proposes that engagement with electoral processes can prompt a preference for political pragmatism. The "inclusion-moderation hypothesis" proposes that members of office-seeking niche parties inevitably moderate (Brocker and Künkler 2013). The shift may be strategic if party members come to appreciate the Downsian intuition that electoral viability requires moderation (Downs 1957; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Such a shift may result from party members learning and deciding that they prefer democratic politics over non-democratic alternatives (Kalyvas 2003) and from the organizational changes and leadership-role changes that democratic political engagement induces (Sanchez-Cuenca 2004). Although civic inclusion campaigns are not designed to move former combatants' towards one side or another of a policy or ideological debate, by promoting engagement with democratic politics, civic education may inspire preferences for a moderate party strategy among the base and leadership. We hypothesize that the civic inclusion campaign will increase former combatants' support for a strategy of party moderation (**H2**).

Context

After more than five decades of civil conflict, the FARC signed a peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016. The agreement sanctioned the creation of the new political party initially known as *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común* (also identified as FARC), and assigned them 5 seats in each legislative chamber and waived the electoral threshold requirement unitl 2026. The party has had the opportunity to campaign for seats in the 2018 legislative elections and run for local office in the 2019 regional elections under the new party name Comunes.

Soon after the collective demobilization in 2016, factions within the organization took different paths. Although the vast majority chose to join the political transition and the founding party, there were a handful of commanders who defected and formed an armed splinter group. In August 2019 this splinter group officially announced its decision to take up arms due to their dissatisfaction both with the reinsertion process and with the government's enforcement of the peace agreement (Torrado (2019)). Even among the majority of former FARC combatants, who opted to support the new party, there were important discrepancies regarding the path the party should follow.[1] Hardliners favored maintaining a connection with the guerrilla's ideology, symbols and origin story, while moderates advocated for steering the party platform towards a fresh image that could capture a wider audience and away from some of the elements associated with their insurgent past (Revista Semana (2020)). Although leftist parties support the idea of the FARC becoming a political party, none seemed willing to form coalitions with them (Garcia Segura (2016)).

---

[1] Note that we are considering participants of the 2016 collective demobilization and not deserters who demobilized prior to the agreement.

Despite connections to drug trafficking and numerous terrorist attacks throughout their long history, since its conception FARC claimed to be a political guerrilla movement that emerged as a response to the lack of formal channels to participate in legal politics and severe economic inequality (Molano 2016; Karl 2017). FARC members and supporters often resided in rural areas (Ramírez 2011) plagued with corruption and little to no state consolidation, resulting among other things in low levels of trust in democratic institutions (Rojas Bolaños and Benavides Silva 2017). Although ideological and economic motivations incentivized some individuals to join the guerrilla, many joined the guerrilla for protection after being victimized by the state or paramilitary groups.

Both party leadership and the Colombian government have acknowledged the importance of promoting ex-combatants' political engagement and trust in democracy in order to consolidate peace, especially in light of past failed attempts at political integration of FARC and the more than 300 ex-combatants that have been killed since the signing of the agreement (UN 2022). The current process has been heralded as a new opportunity to ensure the peaceful participation of former members of armed organizations motivating an interest among various external organizations and the FARC itself in civic inclusion programs. However, ideological commitments and ex-combatant victimhood have affected how ex-combatants relate to state institutions in the conflict aftermath (Schmidt 2021; Krystalli 2019).

Research Design

Our aim is to estimate the effect of the civic inclusion campaign on ex-combatants' political attitudes and intentions to participate. In gaining the cooperation of the FARC, the Colombian Agency of Reincorporation and Normalization, and implementing nongovernmental organization (NGO), the study had to meet the following conditions: (1) information presented was true and objective, (2) survey responses remained anonymous, (3) participation was voluntary, and (4) all interested ex-combatants would be able to participate. Party officials were especially keen on the last condition. In order to accommodate this and still ensure the evaluation upheld experimental rigor, we randomly selected a group of participants to take the survey before the workshop, and a group of participants to take the survey after the workshop. We recognize that this introduces an automatic confound with respect to time, but the design has two main benefits. First, by deciding to conduct the survey only once per participant we avoid the issues that may arise when asking respondents to answer the same survey twice, namely the possibility of priming or inducing expectations of change in their responses. Second, the individual-level randomization confers some power advantages as compared to a site-randomized study (that used e.g., a placebo curriculum), as we are able to obtain both treated and control observations within each site.

Beyond this specific feature of this design, we identify four main challenges that require in-depth consideration. The first one is the possibility of bias due to social desirability or experimental demand effects. The second one is related to the convenience sampling this study relies on. The third one is related to the duration and relevance of the treatment effect. Finally, despite our working with all relevant authorities and ensuring voluntary consent throughout there are important ethical considerations. Given space limitations, each of these important topics is covered in detail in the Appendix. We believe that our design and analytical strategy was able to make the most of this historical opportunity while addressing confounding and ethical concerns. We also note that we had intended to carry out a longer term follow-up in 2020, but were unable to do so because of the COVID-19 pandemic and security concerns that limited our ability to collect ex-combatant information that could be used for individual virtual follow-ups.

The civic inclusion campaign

A local NGO, *Corporación Razón Pública*, specializing in civic education programs, worked with the researchers to design the intervention. Civic education initiatives are usually bundled treatment with two main components, providing information and fostering discussion. In keeping with this notion, the civic inclusion campaign lecture content was was designed to inform citizens about the democratic process and ways to participate, including voting in the upcoming elections. The program provided practical knowledge regarding legal channels of political participation and to increase ex-combatants' knowledge of the state, its institutions, and the responsibility of different state's offices. It was *not* designed to shift individual policy preferences, influence ideological commitments, or make the case for moderate electoral platforms. FARC's party strategy was not part of the presentation, nor the strategy of any other party. The workshops were also designed with the intent of offering a neutral space for discussion and deliberation: discussions among participants were not only allowed but encouraged.

Specifically the workshops occurred as follows. Each participant attended a single 4-hour workshop, that included a presentation led by a CRP specialist covering three components. The first component was 'parts of the Colombian state,' the second component was 'channels of legal participation,' and the third was 'campaigns and elections.' Provision of information can mitigate informational barriers to participation, demystifying the process and enabling people to engage with the political system more confidently (Keele 2007, Gottlieb 2016). This aspect of the treatment is expected to affect the outcomes related to trust in institutions and political participation (H1) – especially the section dedicated to parts of the Colombian state. Additionally, encouraging deliberation in a neutral space may be a critical feature of programs that are focused on addressing mistrust or political choices that depend on coordination (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017; Adida et al. 2020). The presentation and discussion of channels of legal participation and campaigns and elections, in which the pragmatic benefits of moderation may be more evident, could potentially affect the outcomes related to moderation (H2).

In order to create a space that was as safe and judgment-free as possible, before and after the presentation of the three major topics, the instructor promoted participation and debate among participants. The role of FARC leadership was limited as much as possible in order to create a space that elicited discussion in a way that was likely unavailable within the rank-and-file of the FARC during the conflict. The objective was to mitigate as much as possible any incentives to censor themselves or to posture. The facilitator was not affiliated with the party and was sure to identify as a member of an impartial NGO and not an advocate of a party. More details about the content of the workshop and its activities are described in Appendix B.2, which includes anecdotal accounts from the instructors' notes on the dynamics of each of the workshops. Appendix B.1 describes detailed information on the project logistics including FARC approvals and the role of *Corporación Razón Pública*.

Site selection



Figure 1: Study Location

#	**Site location**	**N**	**TZ**
1	Arauquita	32	Yes
2	Bogotá	16	No
3	Coyaima	29	No
4	Florencia	13	No
5	Iconozo	14	Yes
6	Montañita	32	Yes
7	Planadas	26	Yes
8	Villavicencio	22	No
9	Vista Hermosa	91	Yes

Figure 2: Site locations

We pre-selected municipalities with more than 50 ex-combatants and selected sites that were part of the initial Transitional Zones (TZ) or were close to them (See Figure A 8). In addition, the selected municipalities also had the available space to carry out the activities and relatively accessible to instructors and enumerators in terms of physical access and security conditions. There are some differences across sites worth noting. Five of the nine sites were transitional zones that housed ex-combatants after the peace process. While Coyaima is not a transitional zone, the party selected it as the first location to implement the study because many former combatants formerly from the Planadas and Iconozo TZs reside there. Within the TZs where we implemented the study, there are no relevant differences in terms of income, conflict exposure, and the number of ex-combatants. The other locations are bigger cities where the party could send invitations to many ex-combatants and that were relatively close to the TZs. We discuss heterogeneous treatment effects by sites in

Appendix K.3 and expand on details about timing and other aspects of the research design in Appendix B.1.

Recruitment

In each of the sites a local coordinator, typically FARC's representative in the municipality, invited ex-combatants through group chats that were comprised of former FARC combatants. The invitation explicitly detailed the workshop was not party-sponsored nor funded and that their attendance was not contingent on their affiliation to the FARC political party, but rather that an international university was promoting the initiative and a local NGO was implementing the activities. The attendance of civilians, and even of other types of ex-combatants such as deserters, was unlikely. Deserters were often treated as traitors by their units, so it is unlikely that they belonged to this network (Nussio and Ugarriza (2021)). Civilian attendance was especially implausible in workshops that took place in transitional zones. This is confirmed by survey responses which we discuss in further detail in the next section and in Appendix A.5.

Depending on the time the workshop was planned, a light breakfast or lunch was mentioned in the invitation and provided either before or after the workshop. How people were invited to the workshop satisfied the conditions of the representatives of the CNR to include all those who might be interested in attending. Participants were randomly divided into two groups. Prior to handing out the survey, the facilitator informed participants that their privacy was of utmost concern and that their answers were anonymous. Participants were asked to refrain from writing their names or any identifying information to ensure anonymity. They were told their answers would be compiled and analyzed by the local NGO and the university research team respectively, and no other party could access their individual responses. The facilitator explained their responses to all questions would be greatly appreciated but that no question in the survey was mandatory and they were free to leave questions blank if they did not feel comfortable responding. At least one of the facilitator's assistants was always available to answer any questions about the survey. While the first group answered the survey, attendees from the second group were asked to sit together in a circle with the facilitator. The facilitator asked what their expectations of the workshop were and what specific questions they had about the Colombian political system and existing mechanisms for participation in democracy they wanted answered. Once the workshop ended, individuals that had been assigned to respond to the survey after the workshop were provided the same information and assistance.

This form of sampling inevitably induces certain selection problems. Ex-combatants who participate may, for example, have more interest in politics than the average ex-combatant. In the next section we compare our sample with results from a census of ex-combatants and examine differences that may be relevant for interpreting our results. Further details are presented in Appendix A.3.

Data

The sample consists of 275 respondents, with ages ranging from 19 to 78, and just under half were female. More than half of respondents identified as mestizo, and the average ex-combatant had some years of secondary education. Most had at least some direct combat experience, indicated by the responses to questions regarding their conflict experience. (Note the conflict experience score combines responses to three questions asked about experience with violence using an inverse-covariance weighted index and is scaled by pooled outcome standard deviations.) The treatment group was slightly more male, whiter and slightly less educated than the control group. We control for these and other demographic characteristics in the analysis. We also compare to the broader FARC ex-combatant population, per the UN-CNR (2017) census of demobilized FARC and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization's 2019 census. Our sample was more female and educated (see Appendix Section A.3for more detail).

In the experiment, 60% of participants were randomly selected to complete the survey after the workshop (the treatment group) and the rest were asked to complete the survey prior to the workshop (the control group). The imbalance between treatment and control is attributable to limits on the number of interviews that could be completed prior to the start of the workshop. This occurred mostly in places where individuals arrived relatively late (Arauquita, Villavicencio and Vista Hermosa) leaving no time to interview half of them prior to the start of the workshop. A total of 164 individuals were assigned to the treatment group, but 7 of these responded to the survey before the workshop, indicating a modest amount of non-compliance. In the case of the control group, 111 individuals were assigned to this group, but 1 took the survey after the workshop. Given these small rates of non-compliance, our analysis employs treatment assignment as the explanatory variable and estimates intent-to-treat (ITT) effects.

Finally, the majority of ex-combatants reported they were currently undergoing the reinsertion process that was prompted by the signing of the 2016 peace agreement. Only 36 indicated they were not currently undergoing the reinsertion process and our analysis suggests these are likely *milicia* members and not deserters. Importantly, as Table A3shows,

Table 1: Summary statistics and balance (N = 275, 158 treated, 117 control)

	Sample Min	Sample Max	Baseline St. Dev	Treated St. Dev	Balance Diff	Baseline Mean	Treated Mean	Population Mean
Demographics								
Age	19	78	12.29	11.44	0.21	38.68	38.90	-
18-40 years old †	0	1	0.48	0.48	0	0.65	0.65	-
Education (0-6 scale)	0	6	1.45	1.47	−0.26	3.21	2.95	-
None or basic schooling †	0	1	0.39	0.42	0.04	0.19	0.23	0.68
Female	0	1	0.50	0.49	−0.05	0.45	0.40	0.33
White	0	1	0.36	0.45	0.12	0.15	0.28	-
Black	0	1	0.36	0.32	−0.04	0.15	0.11	0.12
Indigenous	0	1	0.18	0.26	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.18
Conflict experience								
Frequency life threatened †	0	3	1.10	1	0.04	2.31	2.35	-
Frequency combat †	0	3	0.95	0.93	0.05	2.07	2.12	-
Frequency shot at or bombed †	0	3	1.02	0.95	0.12	2.07	2.18	-
Conflict experience score	−2.10	0.80	0.82	0.72	0.06	0	0.06	-
Main outcomes								
Support platform moderation	0	10	3.83	3.49	1.44	5.44	6.88	-
Support alliance moderation	0	10	3.59	2.78	1.08	6.76	7.86	-
Moderation score	-1.67	1.03	0.93	0.71	0.36	0	0.36	-
Trust institutions score	-1.59	2.46	0.67	0.71	0.16	0	0.16	-
Trust democracy score	−1.75	1.60	0.55	0.59	0.18	0	0.18	-
Participation score	−4.51	0.25	0.67	0.68	−0.05	0	-0.05	-
Secondary outcomes								
Ideology (Right-left scale)	0	10	1.72	1.95	−0.09	9.06	8.97	-
Loyal to FARC rev. ideals	0	10	1.32	1.39	0.14	9.53	9.67	-
Satisfaction FARC implem.	0	3	0.71	0.79	0.04	2.32	2.35	-
Participation in 2016 elections	0	1	0.50	0.50	0.04	0.47	0.51	-

Note: The measures with the † are included in the table for the purpose of comparing to ex-combatant census measures but are not included in the analysis. Column (5) shows the coefficients of a simple regression specifications that we use to estimate effects with no controls. ***Demographics:*** *The measure of education in the survey is a 7-point scale with 0 indicating no schooling and 6 indicating completed university. Mestizo is the reference level of race in the analysis.* ***Conflict experience:*** *The first three measures are categorical, where 0 = never and 3 = often.* ***Outcomes:*** *The measure of ideology is a 10 point scale with 0 indicating extreme right and 10 extreme left.* $^{*}p<0.1;^{**}p<0.05;^{***}p<0.01$

there are no detectable differences in how the workshop affected respondents who were undergoing reinsertion versus those who were not. Although the CNR have data on all FARC ex-combatants and details of their status those data are inaccessible to researchers in an effort to protect ex-combatants. Moreover, we were asked not to screen participants directly on the basis of status.

The outcome variables of interest include measures of trust, intended participation, and moderation. We measured trust in institutions with questions on trust in government, the mayor, the 2019 elections, the justice system and the Special Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP). Trust in democracy is measured with five questions on whether democracy is the best form of government, whether the system is inclusive, whether FARC can achieve its political objectives within democracy, whether their voice can influence government, and whether mechanisms of citizen participation are efficient. Intended participation is measured with questions on participation in the upcoming elections, support for a candidate, and campaigning for a party. We then create four standardized indices as measures of our four different outcomes of interest using inverse co-variance weighting (ICW) (Anderson 2008), and scaled by pooled outcome standard deviations (Cohen's d statistic). To address item-level missingness, we used predictive mean matching imputation with the `mice` package (VanBuuren 2021). Table A1 shows summary statistics for this sample without imputation, and specifications without imputations in Appendix E yield the same conclusions.Support for alliance moderation and platform moderation are captured by responses to two separate questions. To measure support for platform moderation, respondents were asked how much they agreed with the following: *FARC's electoral success depends on their willingness to become ideologically closer to other political parties.* The statement used to gauge support for alliance moderation was as follows: *FARC's electoral success depends on their capacity and disposition to form political alliances.* Appendix J describes the specific survey wording.

Data Analysis

Our quantity of interest is the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect, estimated via the following weighted least squares regression $Y_{is} = \alpha + \beta D_{is} + \gamma \mathbf{X}_{is} + \delta_s + \epsilon_{is}$ where D_{is} is an indicator for random assignment to receiving the survey before or after the workshop, $\mathbf{X}_{is}$ is a vector of all demographic characteristics asked in the survey (age, gender, race, level of educational attainment) and a measure of conflict experience due to theoretical priors. Questions on unit characteristics were asked but excluded from the analysis due to high missingness of nearly 30%. Y_{is} represents the outcomes of interest and δ_s denotes site fixed effects. We use weighted least squares regression to account for the fact that the probability of being treated varied by site, with weighing based on the site-specific probability of being assigned to treatment or control. The study's main hypotheses and description of statistical tests were registered prior to analyzing the data, yet the analysis of the mechanisms and heterogeneous treatment effects presented in the Appendix F was exploratory and was not pre-registered. The anonymized registration as well as a discussion of deviations are in Appendix I.

Main findings

We begin with findings related to H1, the effect of the civic inclusion campaign on trust in institutions, trust in democratic governance, and willingness to participate in democracy. Table 2 presents the ITT effect on the scores for each of these outcomes. The positive effects on trust in democracy are consistent with existing work that suggests that civic education programs, be it due to an informational effect, an organizing effect, or a combination of these, can increase respondent trust. The largest effect was on respondent's trust in democracy, increasing reported confidence in democracy by 0.17 standard deviations. Similarly, the workshop promoted an increase in trust in institutions of 0.11 standard deviations, although it is not statistically significant at the 90% level. One potential explanation to this difference is that distrust in institutions may be more difficult to shift given it may be shaped by the group's historical antagonism with the Colombian state and its members, whereas trust in the system of democracy may be shaped more by conceptual concerns and so may be responsive to new information about the democratic system. The workshop had no effect on intended participation. Figure A5(c) suggests this may be due to a ceiling effect, given baseline levels of intended participation were already near the top of the scale.

Table 2: Effects on Trust and Participation (ITT)

	Trust institutions		Trust democracy		Participation in democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ITT Effect	0.14	0.11	0.17^{**}	0.17^{**}	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

To further contextualize these effects, note that baseline trust in democracy and in institutions are relatively low (See Figures A5(a) and A5(b)). Estimates of Colombian public opinion show that ex-combatants' perceptions of democracy as the best form of government conform with that of civilians (LAPOP 2018). However ex-combatants' are far more distrustful of institutions with the notable exception of the JEP, which was created to uphold the peace agreement. In the baseline the average ex-combatant scored their trust in the justice system a 0.97/10, compared to a LAPOP equivalent of 4.4/10. Likewise, mean ex-combatant trust in the executive was 1.19/10 compared to a LAPOP equivalent of 4.9/10. Yet contrary to our expectations and existing literature (e.g., Gamson 1968; Sigelman and Feldman 1983), the low levels of trust in institutions do not correspond to low intention to participate. This disconnect between participation and trust suggests that behaviors might be determined by a multitude of factors beyond trust and attitudes. Perhaps ex-combatant participation is driven by a diffuse sense of duty and appreciation for the need for participation to bring about change, or perhaps their intention to participate is driven by party discipline. One interpretation of what the intervention might do is provide ex-combatants with a better sense of the reasons as to why they want to participate.

We now turn to the findings related to H2, the effects on ex-combatants' expressed preferences for party moderation. We find that the workshop increased preferences for moderation. Table 3 displays the ITT effect on respondent's support for FARC forming strategic political alliances (alliance moderation) and for FARC moving ideologically closer to other parties (platform moderation) in order to improve the party's chances of electoral success. The effect on support for platform moderation corresponds to a about a 1-point increase on a 0-10 scale (with 10 corresponding to total support), from an average baseline response of 5.44 to a post-treatment 6.7. The effect on support for platform moderation is similar in size. Using a combined index based on the sum of the two outcomes and then standardized, shows an effect of a 1/3 of a standard deviation, significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 3: Support for Party Moderation (ITT)

	Combined moderation score		Alliance moderation		Platform moderation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ITT Effect	0.38^{**}	0.26^{**}	1.27^{**}	0.80	1.28^{**}	1.26^{**}
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.48)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	220	220	220	220	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. P-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons. The difference in number of observations is due to the unintended exclusion of the alliance moderation measure in two workshops. Unfortunately, facilitators accidentally printed out a version of the survey that excluded this question in Planadas and Coyaima.$^{*}p<0.1$;$^{**}p<0.05$;$^{***}p<0.01$

Heterogeneous effects by demographic characteristics for both H1 and H2 are presented in the Appendix F. Most notably, there is some indication that the platform moderation effect was stronger among women albeit they were not more trusting in democracy nor institutions nor were they more willing to participate in democracy as a result of the workshop.

Mechanisms underlying effects on moderation

Providing people with information to promote their engagement with democracy reflects a basic civic principle and is a widely used approach to promote the enfranchisement of electorally marginalized populations. These types of civic education programs anticipate fostering trust and therefore engagement with the electoral system. Our results suggest that these types of interventions may have the anticipated effect of fostering trust in democracy, even among a population of former combatants. However our results also show that ex-combatants' increased their average willingness to support a more pragmatic party platform that engages in compromise and moderation, despite the fact that the workshops did not include discussion on electoral strategies generally nor specifically regarding the FARC party's election strategies. The moderating effects of the intervention may have political ramifications, leading us to focus the rest of the analysis on understanding why moderation resulted from this campaign. We do however expand on our discussion of H1 in the Appendix F.

Learning and strategic adjustment

First, insights from the inclusion-moderation literature suggest that moderation may be a strategic response (e.g. Tepe (2019)). To investigate this mechanism, we evaluate heterogeneous treatment effects by education, which we assume may be correlated with individual potential for strategic learning. More educated participants may be more likely to reflect on the strategic importance of being out of line with others, and so potentially more open to adjusting their expressed point of view in those terms. This assumption is motivated by observations we made in the field on how the more educated ex-combatants seemed much more concerned with issues of ideological coherence. In Figure 3, plots on the left side illustrate the relationship between the outcomes and education in the baseline while plots on the right show the same for the treated group. Each point represents the average outcome at each level of education, and point size indicate the number of observations at each level. See

Table 14 for the corresponding regression estimates. We find a steep negative relationship between education and both moderation outcomes, such that the least educated respondents are vastly more supportive of FARC's alliance and platform moderation than more educated peers. This is surprising in light of the notion that moderation is a result of enhanced strategic thinking. There is no correlation between education and personal ideology so it is not the case that less educated ex-combatants reported more centrists personal ideologies (see Appendix G). We can only speculate about what explains this pattern in the control condition. One possibility is that educated peers are better versed in the theory behind their group's revolutionary ideology and feel more dissonance between their ideology and political compromise. This would be consistent with the fact that, in the baseline, more educated ex-combatants are relatively more supportive of alliance moderation than of platform moderation.

The relationship between education and moderation flattens out in the treatment group, especially for platform moderation, suggesting the civic inclusion campaign's effect is driven by a change in the preferences of militant-educated types. It is possible that the information provided during the workshop clarified the strategic value of platform moderation to more educated peers, which caused them to adjust accordingly. It is also possible that more educated ex-combatants overestimated the ideological rigidity of their peers and adjusted upon learning their moderation, given that doing so could serve them well both within their group and vis-a-vis electoral competitors outside the group. This updating may be especially possible in the workshop setting relative to daily life, given open discussion was encouraged and valued so that less educated, more moderate individuals may be more likely to express their views than would typically be the case.



Figure 3: Education and moderation score before and after workshop

Shifting personal ideology

A second possibility is that gaining a deeper understanding of democracy may have moderated ex-combatants' beliefs, increasing their support for party moderation. We evaluate this mechanism in two ways. First, we examine the workshop effect on ex-combatants' reported ideology and find that after the workshop they tend slightly more towards the center. Table A22 shows that the campaign shifted ex-combatant ideology from an average baseline response of 9.05 to 8.67 on the 0-10 scale, a substantively small shift from very left leaning, to slightly less left leaning and not significant at the 90% level. Furthermore, mediation analysis (Figure 4) finds that personal ideology did not mediate the effect of the campaign on either support for alliance or platform moderation.

Second, we examine the interaction effects for conflict experience and find that it is substantial, especially for alliance moderation. In the baseline, the preferences of ex-combatants' who experienced a more violent war time were less supportive of political compromise than that of their peers who had a less violent conflict experience. This baseline relationship is consistent with evidence that suggests that the experience of conflict can cultivate hard-line positions (e.g. Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015). Figure 5 shows this relationship flattens out in the treatment group. These heterogeneous effects by conflict experience sug-



Figure 4: The figure shows estimates of the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of personal ideology on the moderation score (combining platform and alliance moderation), as well as the average direct effect (ADE) and total effect of the civic inclusion campaign on the moderation score. The definitions of the ACME and ADE as well as the implementation follow Tingley et al. 2014.

gest that the campaign may have also moderated hard-line attitudes caused by the experience of violence. See Table A16 for the corresponding regression estimates.



Figure 5: Conflict experience and moderation measure before and after workshop

Mitigating posturing

Another plausible mechanism is that by creating a setting where participants felt comfortable, the workshop may have shifted people's willingness to express latent moderate views. Prior to the workshop, individuals may have been prone to posturing towards peers, higher ups, and the survey interviewers by expressing more radical views, even though surveys were anonymous. In order to assess the plausibility of this mechanism, we evaluate whether a similar shift occurs in other outcomes where we'd expect attendees to have the same incentives to posture: satisfaction with FARC's implementation of the agreement, loyalty to FARC's revolutionary ideals and personal ideology. Table A22 shows that we find no evidence that the civic inclusion campaign reduced posturing.

Experimenter demand effects

Experimenter demand effects would be a concern in this design if treated (post-workshop) ex-combatants differed from control (post-workshop) ex-combatants in feeling obligated to report positive or moderate attitudes, perhaps to appease what they perceive as the facilitators' or FARC leaderships' expectations (Morton and Williams 2010). First, our research design balances out any fixed features of the environment that could lead to such a differential sense of obligation. Both groups were similar in terms of their exposure to the presence of FARC leaders, for example. Second, respondents were made well aware that the survey was anonymous and that there was way that they could be identified from their responses. This attenuates respondent's sense that they might be rewarded for reporting more positive attitudes towards the political system (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez 2018). It was also made clear that although the local NGO was facilitating the workshop they would not have access to responses. Third, the moderation measures are unlikely to have been subject to experimenter demand effects, because the workshop was narrowly focused around providing information regarding the political system and mechanisms of political participation, and did not delve into party strategies. Unlike positive effects towards democracy for instance, it would be a leap for respondents to infer the experimenters' hypothesis regarding respondent moderation (Mummolo and Peterson 2019).

Finally, we test for experimenter demand effects by evaluating whether respondents were more likely to provide socially desirable answers on pre-treatment outcomes, namely participation in the 2016 elections, finding no clear indication of such an effect. These results are in the Appendix K where we also report analysis of other potential explanations. We explore the possibility that moderation is driven by a positive shift in trust and study effects by site to see if the workshops heightened coordination among participants. We do not find indication of such effects.

Conclusion

The political integration of former insurgents is a crucial step toward securing long-term peace after civil war. This is especially true in contexts where peace agreements are centered around the democratic participation of ex-combatants. Strategies to promote democratic political integration of demobilized insurgents, who specialized in the use of violence to influence government, must address how ex-combatants will relate to the post-war party system. Often this means addressing internal barriers to productive political engagement that former insurgents face as a result of their motivations and conflict experience.

We use a field experiment with demobilized former FARC rebels to study whether a civic inclusion campaign can help to mitigate these challenges. Our findings suggest that the campaign reduces the risks posed by the dilemmas that ex-combatants may face in accepting their group's incorporation into the democratic system versus keeping up the fight for revolutionary change. Despite their experience with violence and indoctrination, the campaign increased ex-combatants' trust in democracy and induced a shift toward support for moderation as an effective electoral strategy. Impartial civil society actors have a valuable role to play in reaching out to ex-combatants, who are otherwise embedded in insular social networks that limit exposure to information about the democratic system.

There are a number of reasons to believe this campaign has promise beyond Colombia. First, most of the content of the workshop is based on basic elements of democratic participation and that have been studied with other populations in similar circumstances, including civilians in post-conflict contexts. Second, this is a relatively low-cost intervention that should be easy to replicate in other contexts and could be incorporated into ex-combatant reintegration programming. Future work should seek to overcome some of the challenges this study faces. For instance, our results are based on short-term self-reported answers. Although the mechanisms we positare not contingent on emotions nor other psychological features that may be fleeting, future work should further evaluate this conjecture. As such, the results should be taken with some caution considering that the baseline levels of trust among ex-combatants are very low. While the civic inclusion campaign is an important step in overcoming the barriers presented during a political transition, future studies should experiment with measuring political behavior and examine a longer post-intervention time frame.

This study contributes to the post-conflict and reintegration literatures by providing experimental evidence of a strategy promoting democratic integration. The findings also underscore the relevance of interventions that focus on political integration. To date, the most prevalent studies in developing contexts with ex-combatants' or vulnerable populations evaluate economic reintegration efforts such as jobs training programs and cash transfers, with little indication of secondary effects on political integration (Gilligan, Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2013; Matanock, 2021). We propose that it is important to consider interventions that focus squarely on fostering political engagement and to evaluate effects in terms that speak to the dilemmas of political parties through which ex-combatants might express themselves politically.

References

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell and Maya Sen. 2018. “Explaining Preferences from Behavior: A Cognitive Dissonance Approach.” *Journal of Politics* 80(2):400–411.

Acosta, Benjamin. 2014. “"From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties".” *Journal of Politics* 76(3):666–683.

Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon and Gwyneth McClendon. 2020. “When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination.” *Comparative Political Studies* 53(6):851–891.

Anderson, Michael. 2008. “Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects.” *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 103(484):1481–95.

Arjona, Ana. 2016. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War.* NY, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Arjona, Ana and Stathis Kalyvas. 2011. Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fight. In *Mobilizing for Violence: Armed Groups and Their Combatants.* Palgrave-Macmillan pp. 143–172.

Bauer, Michal, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilova, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel and Tamar Mitts. 2016. “Can War Foster Cooperation.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30(3):249–274.

Beltrán, William Mauricio and Sian Creely. 2018. “Pentecostals, gender ideology and the peace plebiscite: Colombia 2016.” *Religions* 9(12):418.

Blattman, Christopher. 2009. “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda.” *American Political Science Review* 61(4):836–851.

Bouvier, Virginia Marie. 2016. *Gender and the role of women in Colombia’s peace process.* United States Institute of Peace.

Brocker, Manfred and Mirjam Künkler. 2013. “Religious Parties: Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis - Introduction.” *Party Politics* 19(2):172–184.

Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2020. “Political life after civil wars: Introducing the Civil War Successor Party dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* pp. 1–10.

De Juan, Alexander and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2016. “Civil War Violence and Political Trust: Microlevel Evidence from Nepal.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(1):67–88.

De Luca, Giacomo and Marijke Verpoorten. 2015. “Civil War and Political Participation: Evidence from Uganda.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 64(1):113–141.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” *Journal of Political Economy* 65(2):135–150.

Fergusson, Leopoldo, Pablo Querubin, Nelson A. Ruiz and Juan F. Vargas. 2020. "The Real Winner's Curse." *American Political Science Review* 65(1):52–68.

Finkel, Steven E. 2014. "The Impact of Adult Civic Education Programmes in Developing Democracies." *Public Administration and Development* 34(3):169–181.

Gamson, William A. 1968. *Power and Discontent.* Dorsey Press: Homewood, Ill.

Garcia Segura, Hugo. 2016. "La izquierda y la llegada de las FARC." *El Espectador* .

Gilligan, Michael, Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus Samii. 2013. "Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(4):598–626.

Gottlieb, Jessica. 2016. "Why Might Information Exacerbate the Gender Gap in Civic Participation? Evidence from Mali." *World Development* 86(2):95–110.

Grossman, Guy, Devorah Manekin and Dan Miodownik. 2015. "The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Toward War and Peace Among Israeli Ex-Combatants." *International Organization* 69(4):981–1009.

Hadzic, Dino and Margit Tavits. 2019. "The Gendered Effects of Violence on Political Engagement." *Journal of Politics* 81(2):676–680.

Hoover Green, Amelia. 2018. *The Commander's Dilemma: Violence and Restraint in Wartime.* Cornell University Press.

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Demobilization and Reintegration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(4):531–567.

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 52(2):436–455.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2003. Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization. Beyond Christian Democracy. In *European Christian Democracy*, ed. Thomas Kselman and Joseph Buttigieg. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press chapter 12, pp. 293–320.

Karl, Robert A. 2017. *Forgotten peace.* University of California Press.

Keele, Luke. 2007. "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government." *American Political Science Review* 51(2):241–254.

Kreutz, Joakim and Enzo Nussio. 2019. "Destroying Trust in Government: Effects of a Broken Pact Among Colombian Ex-combatants." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(4):1175–1188.

Krystalli, Roxani. 2019. "We are not good victims': Hierarchies of suffering and the politics of victimhood in Colombia." *PhD, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA* .

Kupatadze, Alexander and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2019. "In the Shadow of Conflict: How Emotions, Threat Perceptions and Victimization Influence Foreign Policy Attitudes." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–22.

Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F Walter. 2002. "Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence." *International Organization* 56(2):263–296.

LAPOP. 2018. *The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project.*

Littman, Rebecca. 2018. “Perpetrating violence increases identification with violent groups: Survey evidence from former combatants.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 44(7):1077–1089.

Manning, Carrie and Ian Smith. 2016. “Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups After Civil War.” *Democratization* 23(6):972–989.

Matanock, Aila. 2021. “Experiments in Post-Conflict Contexts.” *Advances in Experimental Political Science. Eds. James N. Druckman and Donald P. Green. New York: Cambridge University Press* .

Matanock, Aila and Miguel Garcia-Sanchez. 2018. “Does Counterinsurgent Success Match Social Support? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Colombia.” *Journal of Politics* 80(3):800–814.

Molano, Alfredo. 2016. *A Lomo de Mula: Viajes al Corazón de las Farc.* Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial.

Morton, Rebecca B. and Kenneth C. Williams. 2010. *Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mummolo, Jonathan and Erik Peterson. 2019. “Demand Effects in Survey Experiments: An Empirical Assessment.” *American Political Science Review* 113(2):517–529.

Mvukiyehe, Eric and Cyrus Samii. 2017. “Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia.” *World Development* 95:254–267.

Nussio, Enzo and Ben Oppenheim. 2014. “Anti-social Capital in Former Members of

Non-state Armed Groups: A Case Study of Colombia." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37(12):999–1023.

Nussio, Enzo and Juan E. Ugarriza. 2021. "Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia's Insurgency." *International Security* 45:167–203.

Oppenheim, Ben, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas and Michael Weintraub. 2015. "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5):794–823.

Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ramírez, María Clemencia. 2011. *Between the Guerrillas and the State.* Duke University Press.

Revista Semana, Editorial. 2020. "La Farc se fragmenta." *Revista Semana* .

Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2013. "War signals: A theory of trade, trust, and conflict." *Review of Economic Studies* 80(3):1114–1147.

Rojas Bolaños, Omar Eduardo and Fabián Leonardo Benavides Silva. 2017. *Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Colombia 2002–2010: Obediencia ciega en campos de batalla ficticios*. Ediciones USTA.

Salvesen, Hilde and Dag Nylander. 2017. "Towards an inclusive peace: women and the gender approach in the Colombian peace process." *The Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution NOREF Report* .

Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 2004. "Party Moderation and Politicians' Ideological Rigidity." *Party Politics* 10(3):325–342.

Schmidt, Rachel. 2021. "Contesting the Fighter Identity: Framing, Desertion, and Gender in Colombia." *International Studies Quarterly* 65(1):43–55.

Schulhofer-Wohl, Jonah and Nicholas Sambanis. 2010. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment." *Folke Bernadotte Academy* .

Shekhawat, Seema. 2015. *Female combatants in conflict and peace: Challenging gender in violence and post-conflict reintegration.* Springer.

Sigelman, Lee and Stankey Feldman. 1983. "Efficacy, Mistrust, and Political Mobilization: A Cross-National Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 16(1):118–143.

Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi. 2008. When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in Post-War Politics. In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. A. Jarstad and T. D. Sisk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soderstrom, Johanna. 2015. *Peacebuilding and Ex-Combatants Political Reintegration in Liberia.* London, UK: .

Tepe, Sultan. 2019. "The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: An Overview." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia Politics* pp. 1–17.

Tingley, Dustin, Teppei Yamamoto, Kentaro Hirose, Luke Keele and Kosuke Imai. 2014. "mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis." *Journal of Statistical Software, Articles* 59(5):1–38.

Torrado, Santiago. 2019. “El disidente de las FARC Iván Márquez anuncia que retoma las armas en Colombia.” *El País* .

UN. 2022. “Mision de Verificacion de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia: Informe trimestral del Secretario General.” S/2022/513.

UN-CNR. 2017. “Caracterizacion comunidad FARC-EP: Resultados generales.” *Censo socioeconomico Universidad Nacional - Consejo Nacional de Reincorporacion 2017* pp. 1–12.

UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. 2019. “The Political Dynamics of DDR.” *UN* .

VanBuuren, Stef. 2021. *mice: Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations*. R package.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The critical barrier to civil war settlement.” *International organization* 51(3):335–364.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton University Press.

Wang, Yuhua. 2019. “The Political Legacy of Violence During China’s Cultural Revolution.” *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–25.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2000. *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press.

Zaks, Sheryl. 2017. “Resilience Beyond Rebellion: How Wartime Organizational Structures Affect Rebel-to-Party Transformation.” *PhD Dissertation for UC Berkeley* pp. 1–225.

Online Appendix to
Democratic Integration of Former Insurgents: Evidence from a Civic Inclusion Campaign in Colombia

List of Appendices

A Additional details about sample 2

B Additional details about the workshops 11

C Addressing concerns about the research design 15

D Graphs of outcomes across treatment conditions 19

E ITT effect estimation for index component variables 20

F Heterogeneous treatment effects 22

G Additional information about ideology 27

H Additional information about conflict experience 28

I Pre-registered Hypotheses and Tests 29

J Instrument Questions: Outcomes 33

K Alternative Explanations 34

A Additional details about sample

A.1 FARC approval and participant recruitment

The *Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación* (CNR) representatives arranged access to our sample through the Head of National Education of the FARC (*Responsable de Educación Nacional del Partido FARC*) and with the Head of Organization of the Eastern Zone (*Jefe de Organización, Zona Oriental*). Both of these Heads had the authorization to work with each of the coordinators of the Transition Zones (TZs) and other sites where the workshops were held and to invite all interested parties. Local coordinators sent the invitations through WhatsApp groups.

The coordinators invited the ex-combatants from each area. According to the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN, the national ex-combatant reintegration commission), the TZs housed an average of 235 ex-combatants at the time of the workshop implementation. The average number of participants in the workshops was 39 participants. There is more variation in the localities that were not TZs including the capital city of Bogotá where the ARN registered 790 ex-combatants. The average number of ex-combatants in these places was 301 and the average number of participants was 20. However, it must be considered that there was a lot of mobility. Therefore, it is difficult to know how many people were actually in each of the places, how many militiamen there were, and how many people saw the invitation (taking into account that the number of ex-combatants did not reflect that many could not have any relationship with the party, did not have a cell phone, access to data, etc.).

Without exception, all participants signed or verbally approved an IRB-approved consent form before initiating activities with an enumerator, who was not part of the FARC. The consent confirmed that participation was voluntary, the data was received anonymously, and that they could participate as long as they wanted.

The draft of the invitation reads as follows: “Compañeras y compañeros, we want to invite you to participate in a workshop about electoral politics promoted by a group of researchers from Coorporación Razón Pública and New York University and approved by the National Party. If you have time on [day and time], there will be a talk and discussion about electoral politics and democracy, and the researchers will do a survey. The meeting will take place at [location]. We also invite you to a snack and spend some time with each other in a relaxed environment. The activities have already received authorization from the National Party management. These activities are essential in light of the elections and will help know the party better. Participation is voluntary, and your answers to the survey will be completely anonymous. It would be great to see you all. Please spread the word to other comrades interested, and let me know if you have any questions."

Participants were told that survey responses will remain anonymous. To ensure this, the enumerators clearly communicated that no one would be able to access and track individual responses other than the researchers. Before the survey, the instructors explained that the answers would be saved in a folder. After each person responded, the survey was collected by non-FARC enumerators, and they keep all the surveys in a folder for the researcher's analysis.

A.2 Summary statistics

The measure of education is a 7-point scale capturing levels of schooling, from 0 indicating no schooling and 6 indicating completed university. Regarding the measure of race, *mestizo* is the reference level. It is worth noting that it is difficult to make exact comparisons based on age and schooling because questions in the census had wider bins.

Table A 1: Summary Statistics Raw Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Assigned to treatment	275	0.60	0.49	0	1
Demographics					
Age	253	38.53	11.45	19.00	78.00
Education (0-6 scale)	265	3.05	1.47	0.00	6.00
Female	260	0.42	0.50	0.00	1.00
White	262	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Black	262	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Indigenous	262	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Conflict experience score	206	0.04	0.75	−2.31	0.80
Main outcomes					
Support alliance moderation	202	7.48	3.14	0.00	10.00
Support platform moderation	253	6.28	3.68	0.00	10.00
Moderation score	198	0.21	0.80	−1.68	0.98
Trust institutions score	241	0.10	0.69	−1.75	2.50
Trust democracy score	197	0.07	0.60	−1.85	1.55
Participation score	244	0.01	0.63	−4.23	0.23
Secondary outcomes					
Ideology (10-point right-left scale)	247	9.11	1.63	0.00	10.00
Loyal to FARC rev. ideals	255	9.60	1.40	0.00	10.00
Satisfaction FARC implementation	265	2.34	0.75	0.00	3.00
Participation in 2016 elections	262	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00

A.3 Sample compared to the census of demobilized FARC ex-combatants

The intervention was conducted in 9 different municipalities. Two thirds of all of workshop participants were born in Meta, Cundinamarca, Caqueta and Tolima, but the sample contains ex-combatants' born in up to 116 different municipalities located across 26 different departments. Relative to the broader FARC ex-combatant population, as reported by the UN-CNR (2017) census of demobilized FARC ex-combatants and civilian militia members and the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization's (ARN) 2019 census, this sample was slightly more educated.[1] The average workshop participant reported their highest level of education was incomplete secondary education, with 28% having incomplete secondary education and 32% having completed secondary education. Meanwhile as of 2017, 21 % of the FARC ex-combatant population had completed secondary education, and 60% had received either basic schooling or no schooling at all. In the broader FARC ex-combatant population, 11% reported no schooling while 5% of workshop participants reported no schooling. With regards to race 55% of all workshop participant reported they considered themselves as mestizo, followed by 22% white, 13% black and 5% indigenous. Indigenous ex-combatants are the most underrepresented in the sample, given 18 % of all ex-combatants identify as indigenous while black ex-combatants are well represented with 12% of all ex-combatants identifying as black. Women were slightly over represented represented in this sample than in the broader population, with 42 % of participants identifying as female relative to 33 % of the ex-combatant population FARC being recorded as female. It is worth noting that it is difficult to make exact comparisons based on age and schooling because questions in the census had wider bins.

---

[1] The data from the ARN is not publicly available and was obtained via a special request to the ARN.

A.4 Balance across treatment conditions

Figure A 1 and Figure A 2 show the distributions of respondents in the treatment and control groups for a number of demographic characteristics to check whether there were any important differences in the underlying characteristics of these groups. The treatment group was slightly more male (46% male in the treatment group, versus 40% male in the control group) and slightly less educated than the control group (2.97 versus 3.24). Regarding differences in conflict experience between the treatment and control group, the control group reported very slight difference in number of battle engagements. We control for these characteristics in the analysis.



Figure A 1: Balance across demographic characteristics



Figure A 2: Balance across conflict experience

A.5 Ex-combatant experience with the FARC-EP

The survey included a number of questions designed to understand in further detail what ex-combatant's experiences were with the FARC-EP during the conflict. Understandably yet unfortunately, this was the section of the survey with the highest level of non-response, with an average non-response rate of nearly 30%, likely due to widespread stigmatization and security concerns that ex-combatants face.

The high rate of non-response in this section affected the extent to which we could verify the reinsertion status of workshop participants. To be clear, we were not concerned that an important number of civilians may have joined. The FARC local leadership that helped recruit via this messaging platform belonged to the current wave of demobilized ex-combatants made the attendance of civilians, and even other types of ex-combatants such as deserters, implausible. Also civilians were especially unlikely to attend workshops that took place in transitional zones which were inhabited exclusively by ex-combatants.

Only 36 participants reported they were not undergoing reinsertion, and both qualitative accounts from facilitators as well as our analysis suggests these were most likely *milicianos*. These participants were four times less likely to respond to questions about their position in the guerrilla, and nearly all of these participants abstained from responding to questions asking about their front, their unit and their commanders. This would be consistent with the fact that they did not belong to these structures during the conflict. Although these characteristics may also be consistent with deserters who demobilized prior to the signing of the 2016 agreement and may be especially hesitant to respond to these types of questions, we think it was generally unlikely that deserters belong to this network of ex-combatants given they were treated as traitors by many units. Also, there were no significant differences in the age distribution of these participants, suggesting that they did not belong to an older generation. Finally, facilitators indicated that in Coyaima there appeared to be *milicianos* attending the workshop, which is consistent with the fact that we see the highest rate of non-reinsertion individuals in Coyaima.

Importantly, as 3 shows, there are no detectable differences in how the workshop affected respondents who reported they were undergoing reinsertion versus those who were not. We also note that Coyaima, which is the place with the highest ratio of individuals who reported not currently undergoing the reinsertion process, has similar effect sizes to that of the other sites and similar distribution of educational characteristics. (See Figure 8)

Table A 2: Summary statistics of ex-combatants' FARC-EP experience (no imputation)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
In reinsertion process	197	0.82	0.38	0.00	1.00
Size of front	137	314.77	289.24	12.00	1,200.00
Age when joined FARC-EP	194	18.12	7.30	8.00	58.00
Years in FARC-EP	186	18.26	8.83	2.00	46.00
Categorical questions (0-3)					
(0 = never, 1 = rarely, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often)					
Frequency of pride in front	219	2.90	0.38	0.00	3.00
Frequency felt heard by commander	208	2.45	0.80	0.00	3.00
Frequency of political debate in your front	220	2.67	0.68	0.00	3.00
Extent of ideological motivations to join or political formation	221	2.84	0.45	0.00	3.00
Extent of training about electoral participation in front	218	1.92	1.12	0.00	3.00
Frequency of violent encounters or battles	221	2.16	0.90	0.00	3.00
Frequency felt life threatened	214	2.40	0.99	0.00	3.00
Frequency of being shot at or bombed	219	2.21	0.92	0.00	3.00
Extent of rejection from civil society	209	0.89	1.06	0.00	3.00
Extent of approval of Havana agreement	264	2.32	0.76	0.00	3.00
Extent of approval of agreement implementation	52	1.13	0.95	0.00	3.00

Table A 3: Heterogeneous effects by ex-combatant report of currently undergoing reinsertion process

	Moderation score (1)	Trust institutions (2)	Trust democracy (3)	Participation in democracy (4)
Treated	0.40	-0.01	0.18	0.07
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Reinsertion	-0.05	-0.27	-0.09	0.07
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Treated*Reinsertion	-0.24	0.17	-0.003	-0.15
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Observations	161	197	197	197

Note: HCSE in parenthesis.All specifications include site level fixed effects. P-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons.*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

B Additional details about the workshops


2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Peace agreement signed
Foundation FARC political party
National legislative elections
Civic inclusion campaign
Regional elections
Cancelled follow-up activities

Figure A 3: Timing of the workshop with respect to key events

B.1 Additional details on the role of Corporación Razón Pública

Participants were informed before the initiation of activities that the workshops were part of an academic initiative, that the program content and survey instrument were approved by the Office of Education and Organization of the political party, and that the project was approved by the FARC representatives at the *Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación*, the institution created during the peace agreement with joint representation by the government and the party to oversee the reincorporation process.

We want to highlight two aspects about Corporación Razón Pública. First, the selection of instructors: the organization had already carried out civic education activities in the past, and had experience in contacting people capable of implementing the workshops and also in fostering discussion with ex-combatants. For our project we contacted and did training sessions with two instructors who could potentially carry out the workshops. Their quality was assessed and verified by the researchers during training sessions prior to the implementation of the workshops. We implemented the workshops with one of these instructors, with the other available as a reserve. Second, both the Colombian government and the FARC, through the National Reincorporation Council (CNR), can approve or reject the participation of external agencies in reintegration activities. Corporación Razón Pública had the approval by members of the CNR to carry out the activities.

B.2 Additional details about content and activities the workshops

The workshops were discussion-based and covered basic aspects of the functioning of democracy in Colombia that can be found in different educational sources: the *Congreso Visible* materials from the Universidad de Los Andes and materias from the Banco de la República offer source material for the substance presented in the workshops. Here we present a summary of the most relevant aspects. Information can be found at `https://congresovisible.uniandes.edu.co/democracia/` and `https://enciclopedia.banrepcultural.org/`.

The instructor was a Colombian graduate student that had previous experience in teaching these kind of workshops. The instructor was the same across all workshops, and she was not informed about the hypotheses to be tested in the study, nor did she participate in the implementation nor design of the survey instrument. The workshops began with an informal discussion about what participating in democracy means for participants. As the presentation progressed, the questions that arose among participants were discussed. The overall length of the workshop varied somewhat with respect to the level of participation and number of participants, but generally lasted around four hours.

After the initial discussion, the presentation was followed by an introduction of the Colombian political system. In this section, the instructor highlighted the relevance of the division of power and each branch of the government was introduced. The discussion included the answer to the question: How is a government like the Colombian one chosen? Then the government's decision-making process was discussed, including topics such as the National Development Plan and the National Council for Economic and Social Policy. The workshop included here the branches of public power: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch. The presentation included a description about the functions of each branch and the main public officials associated with them. This section lasted about an hour. Afterwards, a ten to fifteen minute play activity was carried out in which, through body movements, the memory and concentration of all the participants were stimulated. Discussion during this activity tested the internalization of concepts and helped to resolve doubts that had not been raised during the presentation component. The workshop continued with a presentation of the existing mechanisms for citizen's participation in government. The main discussion was divided into two sections: the first relating to elections and the second regarding other other mechanisms of legal participation. However, the discussion was largely focused around the electoral system and political offices, including details surrounding the legal requirements for political parties, candidates and supporters; campaign information about funds, advertisement and financial accountability; the different positions that people can vote for in general and local election; and elections by threshold and lists. This section lasted about an hour. Finally, the workshop focuses on other organizations and channels of citizen participation. This section talks about civil protection bodies, such as the People's Defense Department, which oversee the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms. The workshop ended with a presentation of other legal channels of participation such as the referendum, the popular legislative initiative, the revocation of mandate, the open council, guardianship action (*tutela*) and the right of petition. In cases where it was requested, participants were left with templates to write a guardianship action and participants discussed topics such as gender inequality and other types of violence relevant to the Colombian context and modes of redress. This section lasted about one hour.

In terms of the accessibility of the workshop and the survey, accommodations were made to incorporate the responses of individuals that had difficulty reading and/or writing. In order to ensure they were included in the sample they were given the opportunity to have a facilitator help them respond to the survey. They would move out of view and earshot from other respondents in order to protect the anonymity of their responses, were ensured that there were no right or wrong answers, that their information would not be shared with others, and the facilitator would read the questions and responses to them. They were also given the opportunity to decline responding to survey questions.

While all the workshops had the same structure, each location had its particularities, which include the presence of political candidates in some of them (Icononzo and Florencia), and publicly recognized members of the political party (Bogotá). There was also variation in the topics of interest: while in some places the presentation did not go beyond the general aspects, in others the participants emphasized specific issues, such as legal resources to avoid the construction of a dam (Coyaima); or a deeper discussions on the definition of democracy and the unfulfilled promises of the 1991 Political Constitution (Bogotá); or about the details to carry out a *Tutela* - protection action (Monteria and Florencia).[2]

Besides the municipalities where the study took place, we had also pre-selected Fonseca (TZ) in the Guajira Department, Dabeiba (TZ), Anori (TZ), and Medellín in Antioquia, Buenos Aires (TZ) in Cauca, and Tibú (TZ) in Norte de Santander. Activities were not viable in these sites because of low number of potential participants, security concerns, or because other activities were planned.

(a) Vista Hermosa (b) Villavicencio

Figure A 4: Workshops in action

---

[2] The tutela protection action is a constitutional mechanism that protects any individual rights when they are violated or threatened by a public authority.

C Addressing concerns about the research design

C.1 Experimenter demand effects

Experimental demand effects are present when participants in an experiment are influenced by their knowledge that they are participating in an experiment or study and by their awareness of contextual features of the study that may alter how they respond (Morton and Williams 2010). The experimenter demand effects could be a concern in this design if we have reasons to believe that treated ex-combatants feel more obligated than control ex-combatants to report more positive attitudes towards political participation, democracy, and Colombian institutions to appease what they perceive to be the facilitators' or FARC leadership's expectations, and not as a result of true attitudinal shifts. In our case, all participants, those in control and treatment groups, knew about the activities and participated in them. We would expect experimental demands to be a major concern, such as to explain part or the whole treatment effect, if participants in the treatment group anticipated any reward to specific answers that were not anticipated by subjects in the control group. While this is unlikely, a number of steps were taken in order to minimize the possibility of demand effects. First, to the extent that some workshops were attended by FARC leaders, both the treatment and control groups were similar in terms of their exposure to the presence of FARC leaders, so any workshop *effects* are unlikely to be biased due to demand effects stemming from differential presence of FARC leadership. Second, respondents were repeatedly informed that the survey was anonymous and that there would be no way that they could be identified from their responses. They were also explicitly asked not to write any identifying information on their survey. This removes respondent's sense that they could be rewarded for reporting more positive attitudes (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez 2018). Third, it was made clear to respondents that although the local NGO was facilitating the workshop, researchers who were largely absent from these workshops would be analyzing the data and facilitators would have no access to individual responses. Fourth, our main outcomes of interest, alliance and platform moderation, are unlikely to have been subject to experimenter demand effects. The workshop was narrowly focused around providing information regarding the Colombian political system and mechanisms of political participation and did not delve into electoral nor party strategies. Unlike positive effects towards democracy for instance, it is theoretically difficult for respondents to infer experimenter's hypothesis regarding respondent moderation (Mummolo and Peterson 2019). Finally, we test the presence of experimenter demand effects by evaluating whether respondents were more likely to provide socially desirable answers on pre-treatment outcomes, namely their participation in the 2016 elections. We do not find any evidence of this bias based on these outcomes. The test is presented below, in Appendix Table 23.

C.2 Selection

The second concern is related to the convenience sampling this study uses, which raises questions about generality to the broader ex-combatant population. Workshop attendees were not randomly selected from the entire universe of ex-combatants. Local group leaders invited all ex-combatants in their area that they could contact. However attendance was not mandatory meaning participants self-selected into the workshop. This raises the possibility that attendees are more politically active than the average ex-combatant or more receptive to information about politics. Our results should be interpreted in light of this possibility. In Appendix Section A.3 above, we discussed how the demographic characteristics of recipient ex-combatants differed slightly from that of the broader population of ex-combatants in that it was more female, and more educated than that of the broader population of ex-combatants.

C.3 Duration and Decay of Effects

Another important concern refers to the duration and decay of the effects of this intervention. It is possible that a half-day workshop may affect the answer to a survey issued immediately after the fact but won't have any effect in the long term. Based on this concern, the original research plan was to continue the activities (workshops and surveys) in the spring of 2020, but these had to be cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic. Cancelling follow up activities had no effect on participant responses because participants had not yet been informed that there would be follow up activities at the time of the workshop. It does however limit our understanding of the duration of the effects we observe. The mechanisms that we posit, namely that of strategic adjustment on the part of more educated ex-combatants, is not contingent changes in emotions nor psychological conditions that may be transient. Rather we posit that the workshop may have affected the calculus that some ex-combatants make, and we have no reason to believe this shift towards a more pragmatic perspective is fleeting. However this conjecture requires further investigation. Still, we believe the results remain theoretically relevant, with important policy implications. Our analysis of effect heterogeneity also reveals patterns that have important implications even if the key effects here are in terms of what participants are willing to express publicly, rather than what they truly believe.

C.4 Ethical considerations

With regard to ethical considerations, the intervention was designed and implemented with the approval of higher authorities and it was conducted as a voluntary exercise with full consent of all participants. The intervention is similar to NGO programming that has taken place or been proposed in Colombia and other post-conflict contexts, although not subject to evaluation. The number of participants per area was small. While the FARC used to be considered a terrorist organization, we believe that this civic inclusion program would not strengthen the military capacity of the organization. Importantly, participation was focused on rank-and-file members, and did not include any of the organization's top leadership. Finally, the workshops offered an open atmosphere in which the NGO facilitators were committed to offering clear and objective information on ways for participants to pursue their rights and address grievances.

Our study protocol prioritized the well-being and safety of the subjects throughout the project. Our protocol was reviewed and approved by our home-university Institutional Review Board (IRB) . Data collection was overseen by individuals trained in the IRB-approved standards and protocols. All participants were given time to read or listen to a consent form. Enumerators let participants know that the activity was voluntary and anonymous and secured their consent prior to their participation. All participants were given time to answer the survey privately and return their answer sheets, which contained no identifying information, to a folder where all other anonymous surveys were held. The survey does not contain any information that could potentially be used against the participants nor the researchers, and no party members would be able to match a survey with a particular subject. No detailed personal information was collected; therefore, it will not be possible to identify the subject through responses alone. Surveys were accessible only to the project's coordinator and then digitized by a third party. Individual participant surveys were labeled using a generic numerical code that was entered the data file.

D Graphs of outcomes across treatment conditions



(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure A 5: Difference in means across outcomes

E ITT effect estimation for index component variables

Main findings in the text include analysis on data with imputed observations. Predictive mean matching imputation was used to address item-level missingness, using the `mice` package for R (VanBuuren 2021). Rates of missingness were generally low, on average 5% for measures of future participation, 8% for all measures of trust in institutions, and 10% for measures of trust in democracy. The only question with missingness beyond 9% was on whether democracy was an inclusive political system and had a missingness rate of 19%. Specifications without imputations are laid out below and yield the same conclusions.

Table A 4: Effects on Trust in Institutions (ITT)

	Trust in local council		Trust in national government		Trust in justice system	
Treated	0.78^{**}	0.70^{***}	0.31	0.50^{*}	0.57^{*}	0.64^{*}
	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Imputation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	252	275	254	275	254	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Outcome measures range from 0 to 10.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 5: Effects on Trust in Institutions (ITT) (continued)

	Trust in mayor		Trust in JEP		Trust in 2019 elections	
Treated	0.20	0.37	−0.42	−0.37	0.72	0.47
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.48)	(0.38)
Imputation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	255	275	252	275	251	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Outcome measures range from 0 to 10.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 6: Effects on Trust in Democracy (ITT)

	Democracy is inclusive system		Democracy best form governance		FARC can achieve goals in democracy	
Treated	0.50	0.34	−0.15	0.64	0.96*	0.45
	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.41)
Imputation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	222	275	248	275	255	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Outcome measures range from 0 to 10. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 7: Effects on Trust in Democracy (ITT) (continued)

	Have a voice in democracy		Democratic participation efficient process	
Treated	0.22	0.57	1.08*	0.56
	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.58)	(0.43)
Imputation	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	253	275	245	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Outcome measures range from 0 to 10. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 8: Effects on Participation in Democracy (ITT)

	Vote in 2019 elections		Support FARC candidate		Campaign for any candidate	
Treated	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Imputation	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	266	275	262	275	250	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Outcome measures were binary 0,1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 9: Effects on moderation with no outcome imputation (ITT)

	Moderation score	Alliance moderation	Platform moderation
Treated	0.21	1.14*	0.27
	(0.16)	(0.65)	(0.59)
Imputation	No	No	No
Observations	198	202	253

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects. Both moderation outcomes were measured on a range from 0 to 10. Also it is worth noting that for logistical reasons, the alliance moderation outcomes were not measured in 2 out of the 9 sites. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F Heterogeneous treatment effects

F.1 By gender

In the context of a male-dominated political environment, effects by gender are particularly important. Table 10 shows that the impact of the civic workshops on moderation is slightly higher for women than for men, especially regarding platform moderation (Column 3). We also find a stronger effect on moderation in the site with more women (Icononzo) in Section K. Although the workshop was not focused on women, the peace process and the referendum have extensively discussed gender issues, making this initiative resonate more with women. This is an aspect worth exploring further in future studies. The post-conflict experience of women combatants is not always positive (see especially the experience in Sri Lanka and Peru in Shekhawat (2015)). In the case of Colombia, from the peace talks in La Havana (Bouvier, 2016; Salvesen and Nylander, 2017) to the discussions during the Plebiscite (Beltrán and Creely, 2018), the gender component was deemed central to the reintegration process. Political integration, which has been seldom studied, can be a window to improve post-conflict opportunities.

Table A 10: Heterogeneous treatment effect by gender on moderation

	Moderation score	Alliance moderation	Platform moderation
Treated	0.254**	0.772	1.203**
	(0.121)	(0.489)	(0.476)
Female	−0.010	0.018	−0.289
	(0.204)	(0.816)	(0.736)
Treated*Female	0.352	1.205	1.534
	(0.225)	(0.968)	(0.897)
Observations	220	220	275

*Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of gender equals 1 when female and zero otherwise, and is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls.**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 11: Heterogeneous treatment effect by gender on trust and participation

	Trust institutions	Trust democracy	Participation in democracy
Treated	0.102	0.164^{**}	-0.020
	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Female	0.065	0.006	0.111
	(0.133)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Treated*Female	0.102	0.224	0.018
	(0.184)	(0.140)	(0.139)
Observations	275	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of gender equals 1 when female and zero otherwise, and is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.2 By age

Table A 12: Heterogeneous treatment effect by age on trust and participation

	Trust institutions	Trust democracy	Participation in democracy
Treated	0.104	0.177^{**}	-0.016
	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Age	-0.007	0.010^{**}	0.008^{**}
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Treated*Age	0.005	-0.013^{**}	-0.009^{*}
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	275	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of age is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 13: Heterogeneous treatment effect by age on moderation

	Moderation score	Alliance moderation	Platform moderation
Treated	0.277^{**}	0.847^{*}	1.275^{***}
	(0.119)	(0.490)	(0.473)
Age	-0.006	0.003	-0.060^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Treated*Age	-0.018	-0.060	-0.044
	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Observations	220	220	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of age is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.3 By education

Table A 14: Heterogeneous treatment effects by education on moderation

	Combined moderation score	Alliance moderation	Platform moderation
Treated	0.221*	0.706	1.091**
	(0.122)	(0.492)	(0.468)
Schooling	−0.211***	−0.656***	−0.995***
	(0.055)	(0.241)	(0.183)
Treated*Schooling	0.117	0.274	0.593*
	(0.073)	(0.293)	(0.273)
Observations	220	220	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of education is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. P-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons.*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table A 15: Heterogeneous treatment effect by education on trust and participation

	Trust institutions	Trust democracy	Participation in democracy
Treated	0.116	0.165**	−0.023
	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.079)
Schooling	−0.093*	−0.052	−0.002
	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Treated*Schooling	−0.038	0.026	0.015
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Observations	275	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of education is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls.*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F.4 By conflict experience

Table A 16: Heterogeneous effects on support for moderation by conflict experience

	Combined moderation score	Alliance moderation	Platform moderation
Treated	0.256^{**}	0.781	1.288^{***}
	(0.119)	(0.486)	(0.474)
Conflict	-0.341^{***}	-1.127^{**}	-0.879^{**}
	(0.122)	(0.501)	(0.440)
Treated*Conflict	0.347^{*}	1.097	0.971
	(0.148)	(0.626)	(0.604)
Observations	220	220	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of conflict experience is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. P-values adjusted for multiple comparisons. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table A 17: Heterogeneous effects on trust and participation by conflict experience

	Trust institutions	Trust democracy	Political participation
Treated	0.108	0.177^{**}	-0.023
	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Conflict	-0.120	-0.222^{***}	0.183^{**}
	(0.092)	(0.070)	(0.073)
Treated*Conflict	0.097	0.152	-0.129
	(0.135)	(0.097)	(0.106)
Observations	275	275	275

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of conflict experience is mean centered. All specifications include site fixed effects and controls. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G Additional information about ideology



Figure A 6: Difference in means across measures of ideology

Table A 18: OLS regression ideology and support for platform moderation in baseline

	Support for platform moderation		
Personal ideology (R-L)	−0.006	0.001	0.080
	(0.140)	(0.153)	(0.156)
Site fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	117	117	117
Baseline mean		5.56	
Outcome sd		3.79	

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of ideology ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the farthest possible to the right and 10 the farthest possible to the left. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

H Additional information about conflict experience

Table A 19: OLS regression conflict experience and education

	Conflict experience			
Level of education	0.011	-0.005	0.053	0.068^{**}
	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample	Baseline		Full	
Observations	117		275	

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of education ranges from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating no education and 6 indicating completion of university. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A 20: OLS regression conflict experience and ideology

	Conflict experience			
Personal ideology	0.036	0.021	0.032	0.025
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample	Baseline		Full	
Observations	117		275	

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. The measure of education ranges from 0 indicating no education and 6 indicating completion of university. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I Pre-registered Hypotheses and Tests

Here we include information from our pre-registration filed in February 2020, including the hypotheses registered in the study, along with the methods to test them. Panel A of Table 21 below shows the analyses registered but not included in the main document and its reasons. Panel B shows the analysis included in the main text but not present in the registered plan and its reasons.

In addition to the deviations listed above, the original pre-registration proposed that we would construct our control group by randomly assigning “a group of participants to take the survey a day before the workshop.” However, in the implementation, the control group consisted of a group randomly assigned to take the survey just prior to the workshop (on the same day). Practicality dictated this change. We could not obtain a reliable list of potential participants prior to the workshops to do this randomization prior to the event. Participants had to take time away from their obligations and travel to participate, and so having them come just to take a survey would have been difficult as well. The pre-registration document is inserted below for reference.

Table A 21: Deviations from Pre-Registered Plan

Panel A	
Pre-registered hypotheses	**If not presented in main text, why?**
- Correlation between conflict experience and participation	- Results presented in the appendix. We discuss the implications of the effect of conflict experience for other outcomes in the main document.
- Correlation between conflict training and moderation	- We do not observe enough variation in the conflict training variable to do the analysis.

Panel B	
Additional analyses	**If present in the main text, why not in the registered hypotheses?**
- Treatment effect on moderation by education - Treatment effect on moderation by conflict experience	Both analyses were included in the main test to investigate an explanation for the ITT findings. We discuss the implications for the theory of this additional analysis in the main document.

Registration Information:

Political Participation After Conflict: Experimental Evidence From Ex-combatants in Colombia

(anonymized)

Date Registered:
February 10, 2020

Is this Registration Prospective or Retrospective?

Registration prior to researcher analysis of outcome data

Is this an experimental study?

Yes

Date of start of study

9/18/19

Is there a pre-analysis plan associated with this registration?

No

Background and explanation of rationale.

After over 50 decades of civil war, the rebel group FARC and the Colombian government came to a peace agreement in 2016. One of the fourth sections of the Peace Agreement highlights the establishment of a new political party that will compete for the first time in local elections in October 2019.

We take advantage of this historical opportunity to explore further the relationship between conflict and political participation. While several scholars have shown the impact of war violence on later cooperation, we still lack a better understanding of its reasons. We want to see to what extent to which information about legal channels of participation activate engagement in politics and trust in the electoral system.

What are the hypotheses to be tested/quantities of interest to be estimated?

1) we look at the correlation between wartime experience and political engagement. We expect that greater exposure and political training during the conflict to be positively correlated with post-conflict political participation.

2) we explore the impact that information about legal channels of participation has on the perception about the political process. We expect that knowledge of the legal channels positively affects the perceptions of whether the process itself is inclusive.

3) we explore whether information about the legal political channels affects intentions to participate in politics. We expect that information increases the willingness to participate in politics.

4) we explore the relationship between political training during the conflict and electoral strategy. We expect that more political training during the conflict is positively correlated with a more moderate electoral strategy.

5) we expect that information about political channels of participation will increase the willingness to promote a moderate political platform.

How will these hypotheses be tested?

We will test the hypothesis with a combination of an observational study and a field experiment.

We are going to conduct a survey that tries to capture the way in which a sample of former FARC combatants think about electoral politics and test the effect of a workshop about legal channels of participation.

For the first and forth hypotheses we are going to analyze the correlation between questions that measure conflict experience and questions that measure political participation and electoral strategy.

For the second, third and fifth hypotheses we are going to test the effect of an intervention that consists of a workshop about legal channels of participation. We are going to randomly assign a group of participants to take the survey a day before the workshop and compare their answers with a group that takes the survey just after the workshop. The design will allow us to estimate the effect of the workshop on the proposed outcomes, measured by survey responses from former combatants.

Country
Colombia

Sample Size (# of Units)
250

Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?
No

Has this research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?
Yes

IRB Number
IRB-FY2020-3678

Date of IRB Approval
Oct-19

Third party implementer information
Coorpración Razon Publica

Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?
No

J Instrument Questions: Outcomes

Support for alliance moderation: "How much do you agree with the following statement: FARC's electoral success depends on its willingness and capacity to form political alliances." *(0 = not at all, ..., 10 = total agreement)*

Support for platform moderation: "How much do you agree with the following statement: FARC's electoral success depends on its willingness to become ideologically closer to other political parties." *(0 = not at all, ..., 10 = total agreement)*

Trust in institutions index: "How much confidence do you have in:" national government; mayor; municipal council; justice system; JEP. *(0 = no confidence, ..., 10 = total confidence)*

Trust in democracy index: "How much do you agree with the following statement." "Legal mechanisms of participation (referendums, popular initiatives, recalls) are efficient means to achieve political goals." "The FARC can achieve its political goals within bounds of the Colombian political system." *(0 = not at all, ..., 10 = total agreement)*

Political Participation "Do you plan on voting in the October elections? *(Y/N)* "Do you plan on supporting a FARC candidate? *(Y/N)* "Do you plan on campaigning, either with FARC or another party? *(Y/N)*

K Alternative Explanations

K.1 Mitigating ideology and posturing

Another plausible mechanism is that by creating a setting where participants felt comfortable, the workshop may have shifted people's willingness to express latent moderate views. Prior to the workshop, individuals may have been prone to posturing towards peers, higher ups, and the survey interviewers by expressing more radical views, even though surveys were anonymous. In order to assess the plausibility of this mechanism, we evaluate whether a similar shift occurs in other outcomes where we'd expect attendees to have the same incentives to posture: satisfaction with FARC's implementation of the peace agreement (with 0 indicating no satisfaction), loyalty to FARC's original revolutionary ideals (with 0 indicating no loyalty), personal ideology (right to left). Columns (1) and (2)of Table 22 shows that we have no evidence that the civic inclusion campaign reduced posturing. Column (3) shows the campaign shifted ex-combatant ideology from an average baseline response of 9.05 to 8.67 on the 0-10 scale, a substantively small shift from very left leaning, to slightly less left leaning and not significant at the 90% level. However, a mediation analysis in the main text finds that personal ideology did not mediate the effect of the campaign on either support for alliance or platform moderation.

Table A 22: Evaluating ideology and posturing mechanism

	Satisfied w/ FARC implementation	Loyal to FARC revolutionary ideals	Ideology (R-L)
Treated	−0.127	0.016	−0.373
	(0.094)	(0.231)	(0.234)
Observations	275	275	275
Baseline mean	2.29	9.56	9.15
Baseline sd	0.72	1.30	1.5
Outcome range	[0,3]	[0,10]	[0,10]

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects and controls. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

K.2 Mediation by increased trust

We explore the possibility that the effect on support for moderation is driven uniquely by a positive shift in trust. Increased trust in institutions and democracy may inform the notion that the cost of moderation is worthwhile. We conduct mediation analysis to evaluate the plausibility of this mechanism. As Figure 7 shows, the average causal mediation effect of trust in institutions on the moderation score (combining platform and alliance moderation) is small in relation to the average direct effect, suggesting the moderation effect is not attributable to the positive shift in trust in institutions nor in democracy.



Figure A 7: The figure shows estimates of the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of trust in institutions (left) and trust in democracy (right) on the moderation score (combining platform and alliance moderation), as well as the average direct effect (ADE) and total effect of the civic inclusion campaign on the moderation score. The definitions of the ACME and ADE as well as the implementation follow Tingley et al. 2014.

K.3 Site level effects

It is possible that the campaign effects on moderation were due to heightened coordination among participants. An indication that this mechanism may have been at work is variation in the effect sizes across workshops. Figure 8 shows that the effects on alliance moderation were very homogeneous across sites, with the exception of Iconozo, and only slightly more heterogeneous for platform moderation. We check to see if this variation in sites is explained by (1) the extent to which attendees were likely to know each other, (2) average attendee education, or (3) duration of discussion during the workshop. None of these seem to explain existing heterogeneity as shown in a section below below.



Figure A 8: Effect size by sites

We check to see if site level variation in sites is explained by systematic features of the workshops varying by site, albeit none of these seem to explain existing heterogeneity. First we check the extent to which attendees were likely to know each other. To do this we estimated a unit fractionalization index using information regarding the unit position they were in during the conflict, the idea being these could serve to indicate whether they were likely to know each other from before. Following a standard fractionalization index: $UF_w = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{uw}^2$ where s_{uw} is the share of unit u ($u = 1...44$) in workshop site w ($w = 1..9$). This can be interpreted as the likelihood that any two randomly selected individuals within a workshop site were from different units.Limitations of this measure include that it only captures the unit individuals belonged to the longest as well as missingness in the responses. According to this measure all 9 workshops sites were very heterogeneous, meaning that attendees tended to come from different units. In the least fractionalized site the probability that any two randomly selected individuals belonged to the same unit during the conflict was above 80%. Furthermore, there is very little variation in fractionalization across locations and at a glance it does not seem to explain variation in effect sizes.

Second, we check to see if site level variation in sites is explained by variation in the



Figure A 9: Effect size and unit fractionalization by sites

duration of discussion during the workshop. Finally we check to see if site level variation in sites is explained by the distribution of attendee education. In the figures below, the dotted line shows the average level of education in the sample and the solid line shows the average level of education in the location. It does not appear to be the case that there are systematic differences in site level of education that correspond to larger (or smaller) effect sizes.



Figure A 10: Effect size and workshop duration by sites

K.4 Experimenter demand

Finally we check for the presence of experimenter demand effects by evaluating whether respondents provided answers that would be considered more favorable by facilitators to a pre-treatment question on electoral participation (a "placebo outcome" check). Table 23 shows that workshop participants were not substantially more likely to report they voted in the 2016 elections, which could not possibly have been affected by the intervention.



Figure A 11: Distribution of education by site

Table A 23: Testing for social desirability

	Participation in 2016 elections	
Treated	0.095 (0.067)	0.084 (0.066)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	275	
Baseline mean	0.47	
Baseline sd	0.5	
Outcome range	[0,1]	

Note: HCSE in parenthesis. All specifications include site level fixed effects *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01